Unix security additions

[Tony Sanders]

>In article <1092 at mwtech.UUCP> martin at mwtech.UUCP (Martin Weitzel) writes:
>>backups. Now I complain: This is really bad - I don't trust these people and
>>fear they will use their privilegded account to sneak into other user's files.
What if the backup/restore utilities on the "secure" system used an
encryption scheme before writting to tape (like dump|crypt|dd of=/dev/mt,
assuming each dump will fit on a single tape).  Then tapes written
on the "secure" system could only be read back by the corresponding
restore utility on that system.  You must of course secure the
new backup/restore utilities from them but that's just SOP.

Restoring the information on an insecure system would be useless,
you have to have the password to use it.

I'm a little behind in this group, pardon me it's this has already been
mentioned.

-- sanders at cactus.org
I am not an IBM representative, I speak only for myself.
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